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The Cross-Fertilization of Principles
Relating to Procedure and Remedies in
the Jurisprudence of International Courts
and Tribunals
CHESTER BROWN*
I. INTRODUCTION
It is undeniable that the multiplication of international
judicial bodies, which led to the creation of the Project on
International Courts and Tribunals (PICT) in 1997,' has had
implications for the international legal order. The "proliferation"
of international courts and tribunals might be regarded as a
positive development in that it evidences a trend toward the
peaceful settlement of disputes, and away from non-peaceful
means of regulating differences. This increase in courts, however,
has not come without complications.
As is well known, the growth in the number of international
courts has occurred in the absence of an overarching framework:
there are no formal links between different international courts,
and there is no structural hierarchy within which they operate.2
* Assistant Legal Adviser, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, United Kingdom.
This article is drawn from CHESTER BROWN, A COMMON LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
ADJUDICATION (2007). The opinions expressed herein are strictly personal and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The author is
grateful to the organizers of the PICT Conference on "International Courts and Tribunals
in the 21st Century: The Future of International Justice", which took place at the Peace
Palace, The Hague, on 30 November and 1 December 2007, for the invitation to
participate in that event. Special thanks also to Catherine Brown and Sir Michael Wood
for their comments on an earlier draft. See PICT Conference, International Courts and
Tribunals in the 21st Century: The Future of International Justice, in The Hague, Neth.
(Nov. 30, 2007 - Dec. 1, 2007).
1. See PICT Home Page, http://www.pict-pcti.org (last visited Nov. 17, 2008).
2. See PICT Research Themes: System Issues, http://www.pict-
pcti.org/research/systemic-issues.html.
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This means that international tribunals essentially operate in
isolation from each other. This led the Appeals Chamber of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
to observe in its Prosecutor v. Tadic decision:
International law, because it lacks a centralised structure, does
not provide for an integrated judicial system operating an
orderly division of labour among a number of tribunals, where
certain aspects or components of jurisdiction as a power could
be centralised or vested in one of them but not the others. In
international law, every tribunal is a self-contained system
(unless otherwise provided).'
The proliferation of these so-called "self-contained systems" has
had various problematic effects on the administration of
international justice. One problem is the "fragmentation" of
international law through the emergence of doctrinal
inconsistencies.! In addition, the proliferation creates overlapping
jurisdictions among different international courts, giving rise to the
problem of parallel competing proceedings concerning the same
dispute.' Indeed, concerns have been expressed about the
fragmentation of international law, on which proliferation may
have had an exacerbating effect.6 Both of these issues have been
3. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 1 11 (Oct. 2, 1995), reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 32, 39
(1996).
4. See Jonathan Charney, The Impact on the International Legal System of the
Growth of International Courts and Tribunals, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 697 (1999);
Jonathan Charney, Is International Law Threatened by Multiple International Tribunals?,
271 RECUEIL DES COURS 101 (1998) [hereinafter Charney, Multiple International
Tribunals].
5. See generally YUVAL SHANY, THE COMPETING JURISDICTIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS (2003); R0diger Wolfrum, Kokurrierende
Zustandigkeiten Internationaler Streitentscheidungsinstdnzen: Notwendigkeit ftir
Losungsmoglichkeiten und deren Grenzen, in LIBER AMICORUM JUDGE SHIGERU ODA
651 (Nisuke Ando et al. eds, 2002); Vaughan Lowe, Overlapping Jurisdiction in
International Tribunals, 20 AUSTL. Y.B OF INT'L L. 191 (1999).
6. See, e.g., Gerhard Hafner, Risks Ensuing from the Fragmentation of International
Law, in INT'L LAW COMM'N, Work of its Fifty-Second Session, 143, U.N. Doc. A/55/10;
Gerhard Hafner, Pros and Cons Ensuing from Fragmentation of International Law, 25
MICH. J. INT'L L. 849 (2004). For the International Law Commission's Final Report on
Fragmentation, see Int'l Law Comm'n, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties
Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006). See also Chester Brown, The Proliferation of International
Courts and Tribunals: Finding Your Way Through the Maze, 3 MELB. J. INT'L L. 453
(2002); Martti Koskenniemi & Paivi Leino, Fragmentation of International Law?
Postmodern Anxieties, 15 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 553 (2002); Sir Robert Jennings, The Role of
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the subject of careful attention by writers, and it is not the purpose
of this article to revisit these questions.
This article is intended to address the issue of whether
proliferation leads to emerging common approaches to questions
of procedure and remedies in the jurisprudence of international
judicial bodies, and, if so, why this is occurring. It is by no means
certain that different international courts and tribunals will adopt
consistent approaches to such issues. Indeed, in light of concerns
expressed about the fragmentation of international law, the
multiplication of international courts and tribunals could
conceivably lead to the atomization of these legal categories.
If, however, international judicial bodies adopt consistent
approaches to questions of procedure and remedies, this indicates
that international courts do not necessarily operate as "self-
contained systems," as stated by the Appeals Chamber of the
ICTY.7 This instead suggests that the proliferation of international
courts and tribunals has contributed to the emergence of what
might be described as an international judicial system. Where
common approaches on these issues emerge, it is arguable that this
field of international law is not fragmenting by the rise in the
number of international jurisdictions. Rather, it is developing in a
relatively coherent and consistent manner.
II. EMERGENCE OF COMMON APPROACHES BY INTERNATIONAL
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS
A review of the practice of international courts and tribunals
on a range of issues relating to procedure and remedies reveals
evidence suggesting that there is a tendency, or at least an instinct,
on the part of international courts and tribunals to adopt common
approaches. These universal approaches have led to increasing
commonality in the case law of international courts. This
commonality concerns both the existence of procedural and
remedial powers and the manner in which those powers are
the International Court of Justice, 68 BRITISH Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 60 (1997); Gilbert
Guillaume, The Future of International Judicial Institutions, 44 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 848
(1995).
7. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72 1 11.
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exercised. The practice has given rise to the emergence of what
might be called a "common law of international adjudication. '
The emergence of commonalities is significant because it was
unclear whether the proliferation of international tribunals would
give rise to the convergence in their approach to procedure and
remedies. Moreover, there was the potential for the emergence of
inconsistent approaches to result, because international courts and
tribunals derive their jurisdiction and competence from their own
constitutive instruments and rules of procedure that are not
expressed in identical terms. Further, different international
tribunals have different functions, which could lead to variations in
approach. Nonetheless, the case law of international courts and
tribunals reveals convergent rather than divergent practices on
these issues. It demonstrates that while international courts seek to
apply the provisions of their statutes and rules of procedure, these
instruments do not foresee every procedural issue that may arise in
the course of international proceedings. Additionally, most are
silent on the nature of the remedies that can be awarded. Where
lacunae exist in these instruments and where their provisions might
be interpreted and applied in various ways, international courts
often turn for guidance to the practice of other international
tribunals, and many examples can be cited to illustrate this.
Before citing a number of these examples, it should be noted
that it is not possible in this article to conduct an exhaustive review
of the practices of the many international judicial bodies on all
issues of procedure and remedies. A more extensive analysis is
contained in A Common Law of International Adjudication, with
particular focus on the sources of law relating to procedure and
remedies, aspects of evidence, the power to grant provisional
measures, the power to interpret and revise judgments and awards,
and the availability of remedies! Nonetheless, the following
paragraphs demonstrate the existence of a significant level of
cross-fertilization of principles among different international
courts on various issues.
A first notable example is provided by an early decision of the
Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in the
European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and
8. CHESTER BROWN, A COMMON LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION (2007)
[hereinafter BROWN, A COMMON LAW].
9. See generally id.
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Distribution of Bananas dispute." In its Report, the WTO
Appellate Body referred to the practice of other international
tribunals in holding that a party to WTO dispute settlement
proceedings may be represented by private lawyers. It stated:
We can find nothing in the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization (the "WTO Agreement"), the
DSU or the Working Procedures, nor in customary
international law or the prevailing practice of international
tribunals, which prevents a WTO Member from determining
the composition of its delegation in Appellate Body
proceedings."
This statement by the WTO Appellate Body differs from the
dictum of the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v Tadic.
There, the ICTY Appeals Chamber observed that international
courts and tribunals were all "self-contained systems" unless there
was agreement to the contrary. 2 In comparison, the WTO
Appellate Body deemed it appropriate to consider the practice of
other international courts and tribunals in resolving a procedural
issue for which no provision was made in the WTO Dispute
Settlement Understanding (DSU) or the Working Procedures for
Appellate Review.'3
A second instance, also found in the early case law of the
WTO Appellate Body, is in US-Measures Affecting Imports of
Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, one of the first WTO
disputes. 4 In that report, the WTO Appellate Body referred to,
and adopted, the practice of the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) and other international tribunals concerning the rule on the
allocation of the burden of proof, stating:
[V]arious international tribunals, including the International
Court of Justice, have generally and consistently accepted and
applied the rule that the party who asserts a fact, whether the
10. Appellate Body Report, European Communities- Regime for the Importation,
Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT[DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9, 1997).
11. Id. at 10.
12. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72 $ 11.
13. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
opened for signature Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, art. 1(2) (entered into force Jan. 1,
1995); Working Procedures for Appellate Review, Annex C, WT/AB/WP/W/9 (Oct. 7,
2004).
14. Appellate Body Report, U.S.-Shirts and Blouses, WT/DS33/AB/R
(Apr. 25, 1997).
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claimant or the respondent, is responsible for providing proof
thereof. Also, it is a generally-accepted canon of evidence in
civil law, common law and, in fact, most jurisdictions, that the
burden of proof rests upon the party, whether complaining or'
defending, who asserts the affirmative of a particular claim or
defence.
1
Third, in Ram International Industries v. Air Force of Iran, the
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal evaluated the ability of the
Tribunal to exercise the power of revision. Revision is the power
to reopen a decision or award in light of the discovery of new
evidence that is likely to be a decisive factor.16 It can only be
exercised when new, previously unknown, and relevant evidence is
introduced, and the party claimed revision at the time of
judgment.17 Various constitutive instruments confer the power of
revision. These include the Statute of the ICJ,"8 the Convention on
the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of other States, 9 and the Rules of Procedure of the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS)." In
contrast, the power of revision is not conferred by the
UNCITRAL Rules, which govern the proceedings before the Iran-
United States Claims Tribunal, albeit in slightly modified form.' In
15. Id. at 14. See also Panel Report, Turkey- Textiles, WT/DS34/R (Nov. 19, 1999);
Panel Report, Argentina-Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and
Other Items, 1158-9, WT/DS56/R (Nov. 25, 1997); Panel Report, U.S. -Shirts and Blouses,
WT/DS33/R (Jan. 6, 1997); Panel Report, India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and
Agricultural Chemical Products- Complaint of the United States, 80, WT/DS50/R (Sept. 5,
1997); Appellate Body Report, India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and
Agricultural Chemical Products- Complaint of the United States, T 16, WT/DS50/AB/R
(Jan. 16, 1998); Appellate Body Report, European Communities- Conditions for the
Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, TI 87, 88, 104-105
WT/DS246/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2004) [hereinafter EC-Tariff Preferences].
16. MICHAEL REISMAN, NULLITY AND REVISION 208-12 (1971).
17. See, e.g., BROWN, A COMMON LAW, supra note 8, at 156-8; Robin Geiss, Revision
Proceedings Before the International Court of Justice, 63 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR
AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 167 (2003); REISMAN,
supra note 16 at 208-12; J.L. SIMPSON & HAZEL FOX, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
242-45 (1959).
18. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 61, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055
[hereinafter ICJ Statute].
19. Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States art. 51(1), Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (entered into force
Oct. 14, 1966).
20. International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea [ITLOS] Rules of Procedure,
art. 179.
21. See generally UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 31 UN GAOR, Supp. No. 17, U.N.
Doc. A/31/17 (1976).
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its award in Ram International Industries, the Iran-United States
Claims Tribunal reviewed the practice of the ICJ, arbitral
tribunals, the United States-Mexico Claims Commission, and the
writings of publicists.22 The tribunal then held that despite the
absence of a power of revision in its Rules, an arbitral tribunal
constituting a large number of disputes may have the power to
reopen a case for new evidence if the original decision was induced
by fraud.23
On a similar point, a decision by the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights (IACHR) presents a fourth relevant example. In
Genie Lacayo v. Nicaragua, the IACHR held in unequivocal terms
that it has the power of revision, despite the absence of any such
power in the IACHR Statute or its rules of procedure. It held:
As stipulated in the Statute of the International Court of Justice
and the Rules of the European Court, pursuant to the general
principles of both domestic and international procedural law,
and, in accordance with the criterion of generally accepted
doctrine, the decisive or unappealable character of a judgment
is not incompatible with the existence of the remedy of revision
in some special cases."
Fifth, in Mamatkulov and Abdurasulovic v. Turkey, the
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) dealt with whether the
provisional measures granted under its Rules of Court were
binding." In its judgment, the ECHR made extensive references to
the judgment of the ICJ in LaGrand, in which the ICJ had held
that its provisional measures had binding force. 7 The ECHR also
cited the practice of the IACHR, the UN Human Rights
Committee, and the Committee Against Torture. 8 In a telling
passage, the ECHR observed:
22. Ram Int'l Indus., Inc. v. Air Force of Iran, 29 Iran-U.S. C1. Trib. Rep. 383, 389
(1993).
23. Id. at 390.
24. Genie-Lacayo v. Nicaragua, 1997 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C), No. 45, 6
(Sept. 13, 1997).
25. Id. 19.
26. Mamatkulov & Abdurasulovic v. Turkey, App. Nos. 46827/99 & 46951/99,
Eur. Ct. H.R., 97 (2003).
27. LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.) 2001 I.C.J. 466 (Mar. 2).
28. Mamatkulov & Abdurasulovic, App. Nos. 46827/99 & 46951/99, Eur. Ct. H.R.,
I 39-51, 100-5. See also Mamatkulov & Askarov v. Turkey, App. Nos. 46827/99 &
46951/99, Eur. Ct. H.R., IT 40-53, 112-24 (2005).
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The Court notes that in a number of recent decisions and
orders, international courts have stressed the importance and
purpose of interim measures and pointed out that compliance
with such measures was necessary to ensure the effectiveness of
29their decisions on the merits.
The ECHR duly held that it had the power to order provisional
measures that had mandatory force.3 ' This decision was consistent
with the practice of the other international courts.
A sixth example is found in Aguas Argentinas et. al. v.
Argentina, one of several bilateral investment treaty claims
launched against Argentina." In this case, the question arose as to
whether the International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID) Tribunal had the authority to allow certain non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) to access the hearings, submit
amicus curiae briefs, and have unrestricted access to the
documents in the case." While the Tribunal rejected the NGOs'
application to have access to the hearings and deferred a decision
on granting the NGOs access to the documents, the Tribunal did
permit the NGOs to submit amicus curiae briefs.3 In doing so, the
Tribunal referred to the decision of a NAIFTA tribunal operating
29. Id. 1 101.
30. Mamatkulov & Askarov v. Turkey, App. Nos. 46827/99 & 46951/99,
Eur. Ct. H.R., 118-129 (2005).
31. Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona v. Argentina, Case No.
ARB/03/19, ICSID (W. Bank) (2007). Since the discontinuance of the proceedings by
Aguas Argentinas SA against Argentina (see Aguas Argentinas, SA, Suez, Socieded
General de Aguas de Barcelona, SA and Vivendi Universal, SA v Argentina (ICSID Case
No ARB/03/19, Procedural Order No 1 of 14 April 2006)), this case is now known as Suez,
Socieded General de Aguas de Barcelona, SA and Vivendi Universal, SA v Argentina
(ICSID Case No ARB/03/19). Regarding the many claims against Argentina commenced
under bilateral investment treaties, see also Carlos Ignacio Suarez Anzorena, Multiplicity
of Claims Under BITs and the Argentine Case, TRANSNAT'L DiSP. MGMT., Apr. 2005,
at 20.
32. Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. and Vivendi Universal. S.A.
v. Argentina, Case No. ARB/03/19, ICSID (W. Bank), Order on Amicus Curiae
(May 19, 2005).
33. Id. [ 7-16.
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under the UNCITRAL Rules," as well as the practice of WTO
panels and the WTO Appellate Body.5
Seventh, in MOX Plant, the Tribunal constituted under
Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS) faced the question of whether it had the power to
grant provisional measures other than those requested.36 Both the
text of Annex VII of UNCLOS and the Tribunal's Rules of
Procedure are silent regarding provisional measures." In
addressing the issue, the Tribunal referred to the practice of the
ICJ and the ITLOS, holding:
Although the language of article 290 [of UNCLOS] is not in all
respects identical to that of article 41 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice, the Tribunal considers that it
should have regard to the law and practice of that Court, as well
as to the law and practice of ITLOS, in considering provisional
measures... [A]ccording to article 89, paragraph 5, of the
ITLOS Rules of Procedure, it is open to ITLOS to prescribe
measures different in whole or in part from those requested. A
similar provision is contained in article 75, paragraph 2, of the
Rules of Court of the International Court of Justice. The
Tribunal, having drawn these provisions to the attention of the
parties without comment from either, considers that it is also
34. Methanex Corp. v. United States, Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions From
Third Person to Intervene as "Amici Curiae," 44 I.L.M. 1345, 1 31-34 (NAFTA Ch. 11
Arb. Trib.) (Jan. 15, 2001) (decision of the tribunal on petitions from third persons to
intervene as "amici curiae") (where the NAFTA Tribunal referred, in turn, to the practice
of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, the WTO, and also the practice, albeit
inconsistent, of the ICJ on receiving amicus curiae briefs).
35. Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, Case No. ARB/03/19, 22.
(Referring to "the increased transparency in the arbitral processes of the World Trade
Organisation and the North American Free Trade Agreement," the Tribunal ultimately
granted the NGOs' petition to submit an amicus curiae brief. Suez, Socieded General de
Aguas de Barcelona. SA and Vivendi Universal, SA v. Argentina (ICSID Case No
ARB/03/19, Order in Response to a Petition by Five Non-Governmental Organisations of
12 February 2007)). See also Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. and
Interagua Servicios Integrales de Agua S.A. v. Argentina, Case No. ARB/03/17, ICSID
(W. Bank), Order in Response to a Petition For Participation As Amicus Curiae, t 15
(Mar. 17, 2006) (where the Tribunal found support for its power to accept amicus curiae
submissions "in the practices of NAFTA, the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, and the
World Trade Organisation").
36. MOX Plant (Ir. v. U.K.), Procedural Order No. 3, 42 I.L.M. 1187, 1193
(Perm. Ct. Arb. 2003).
37. Id. 141-43.
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competent to prescribe provisional measures other than those
sought by any party.
The Award on Jurisdiction of the ICSID Tribunal in SGS
Socitg Gnrale de Surveillance SA v. Philippines provides an
eighth example.39 The ICSID Tribunal was faced with the question
of whether it had the power to suspend proceedings pending the
determination of a relevant legal issue by another judicial body."0
In finding that it did have this power, the ICSID Tribunal referred
to the decision of the UNCLOS Tribunal in MOX Plant. In that
case, the tribunal stayed the proceedings before it pending the
institution of proceedings by the European Commission against
Ireland under article 226 of the Treaty Establishing the European
Community."
What can be seen from this brief survey is a readiness by
international courts to look to the practice of other international
courts on issues of procedure and remedies and draw on that
practice. This will increasingly lead to a convergence in the
jurisprudence of international courts. While a pattern of
converging practices does not imply the existence of a completely
uniform approach, it does suggest an emerging body of rules to
which international courts might refer when their statutes and
rules of procedure contain gaps or ambiguities. This emerging
body of rules might be termed a "common law of international
adjudication." This term is not used to suggest that there is an
Anglo-American conspiracy to exert a .dominant influence on
international dispute settlement proceedings to the detriment of
the civilian legal tradition. Rather, it suggests an increasingly
homogeneous body of rules applied by international courts
relating to procedural and remedial issues in cases where there are
lacunae in their statutes and rules of procedure. This emerging
corpus of rules is being developed through a process of cross-
fertilization of principles.
38. Id.
39. SGS Socidt6 G6n6rale de Surveillance SA v. Philippines, ICSID Case No.
ARBI0216, Decision on Jurisdiction (Jan. 29, 2004).
40. Id. 173.
41. Id. 1 171-75. See generally MOX Plant 42 I.L.M. See Consolidated Version of the
Treaty Establishing the European Community, art. 226, Dec. 29,2006, C321 O.J. E/1.
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III. REASONS FOR THE EMERGING COMMON LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION
In light of these examples of cross-fertilization, the question
arises as to why this is happening. There is a wide range of factors
relevant to the emergence of a common approach regarding issues
of procedure and remedies. It would be superficial to suggest that
each factor is applicable in every situation where an issue arises
that might lend itself to the adoption of a common approach.
Rather, the relevant factors-of which twelve can be identified-
may only be applicable with respect to certain issues of procedure
and remedies and before certain international tribunals. It should
also be emphasized that each of the twelve factors, which are
described in the following paragraphs, are not necessarily self-
contained. To varying degrees, overlap exists among them.
A. Similar Drafting of Constitutive Instruments
The first factor relevant to the emergence of a common law of
international adjudication is that the constitutive instruments of
international courts are sometimes drafted in similar terms. For
example, the ITLOS Statute and the Statute of the Court of
Justice of the European Communities were, at least in part, based
on the ICJ Statute." The drafters of the ICSID Convention also
drew on the ICJ Statute. 3 The framers of the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms," the
constitutive instrument of the ECHR, did so also." The ICJ Statute
is almost identical to the Statute of the Permanent Court of
International Justice (PCIJ).' The Statute of the PCIJ was
42. See Barbara Kwiatkowska, The Future of the Law of the Sea in Hamburg, in INT'L
LAW & THE HAGUE 750TH ANNIVERSARY 417 (Wybo P. Heere ed., 1999). See also
Jurgen Schwarze, Origins of the European Courts' Statutes and Rules of Procedure in
EUROPEAN COURTS: PRACTICE AND PRECEDENTS 3, 4-5 (Richard Plender, ed., 1997);
Richard Plender, Rules of Procedure in the International Court and the European Court, 2
EUR. J. INT'L. L. 1 (1991).
43. See CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 56,
59, 453-54, 545, 745-46, 766-67, 856-57, 869 (2001).
44. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953).
45. See Loizidou v. Turkey, App. No. 15318/89, 20 Eur. H.R. Rep. 99, 67 (1995)
(Preliminary objections). The ECHR noted that various provisions of the European
Convention had been modelled on the ICJ Statute.
46. See SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT, 1920-2005, 52-76 (Vol. 1 2006).
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influenced by the constitutive instruments of the first permanent
body for the settlement of international disputes, the Convention
for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes of 1899,4" and
the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International
Disputes of 19078 together with the Draft Convention Relative to
the Creation of a Court of Arbitral Justice of 1907."9 Given the
common origins and similar drafting of these constitutive
instruments, similarities in the way these international courts
interpret many of their provisions is to be expected.
B. Relevance of Precedent
The second factor occurs when an issue arises in one
international court and the resolution is found by looking at how
other bodies with similar constitutive instruments have dealt with
similar issues. This concept of precedent, or stare decisis,
encourages judges on international courts to ask whether the issue
before them was previously considered." This is not to say that the
doctrine of stare decisis is applicable to international law. For
example, article 59 of the ICJ Statute makes it clear that it is not,"
and many international tribunals have expressly stated that they
are not bound by previous decisions.52 Yet, if the reasoning of one
international court is persuasive, that reasoning will often
47. Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, opened for
signature July 29, 1899, 1 BEVANS 230 (entered into force Sept. 4, 1900).
48. Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, opened for
signature Oct. 18, 1907, 1 BEVANS 577 (entered into force Jan. 26, 1910).
49. THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES: THE CONFERENCE
OF 1907 388 (James Brown Scott, ed., Oxford Univ. Press Vol. 1 1920); MANLEY HUDSON,
THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE: A TREATISE 109, 122-81 (1934).
On the work of the Advisory Committee of Jurists in drafting the PCIJ Statute, see Ole
Spiermann, Who Attempts Too Much Does Nothing Well: The 1920 Advisory Committee of
Jurists and the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, 73 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L
L. 187 (2002).
50. See MOHAMED SHAHABUDDEEN, PRECEDENT IN THE WORLD COURT 6 (1996).
51. ICJ Statute, supra note 18, at art. 59 ("The decision of the Court has no binding
force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case.").
52. See Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi v. Pakistan, Case No. ARB/03/29,
ICSID (W. Bank), Decision on Jurisdiction, 76 (Nov. 2005) ("The Tribunal agrees that it
is not bound by earlier decisions, but will certainly carefully consider such decisions
whenever appropriate."); AES Corp. v. Argentina, Case No. ARB/02/17, ICSID (W.
Bank), Decision on Jurisdiction, 30-3 (Apr. 2005). See also SGS Socitg G~nrale de
Surveillance SA, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, 97 ("[A]lthough different tribunals
constituted under the ICSID system should in general seek to act consistently with each
other, in the end it must be for each tribunal to exercise its competence in accordance with
the applicable law.").
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encourage other international courts to adopt the same approach. 3
Sir Hersch Lauterpacht encapsulated this principle most
eloquently when he explained that the ICJ, although not bound by
the doctrine of precedent, nonetheless follows its own decisions:
The Court follows its own decisions for the same reasons for
which all courts-whether bound by the doctrine of precedent
or not-do so, namely, because such decisions are a repository
of legal experience to which it is convenient to adhere; because
they embody what the Court has considered in the past to be
good law; because respect for decisions given in the past makes
for certainty and stability, which are of the essence of the
orderly administration of justice; and (a minor and not
invariably accurate consideration) because judges are naturally
reluctant, in the absence of compelling reasons to the contrary,
to admit that they were previously in the wrong.4
While Sir Hersch Lauterpacht was referring to the practice of the
ICJ in following its own decisions (and those of its predecessor, the
PCIJ), the same consideration is relevant to the practice of
international tribunals cross-referring to the jurisprudence of other
international courts.
C. Methods for Cross-Fertilization
A third reason for the emergence of commonalities in issues
of procedure and remedies is evident in the ability of international
courts to adopt approaches to the interpretation of their statutes
and rules. This custom permits international courts to take account
of the practice of other international tribunals. While international
courts are likely to consistently interpret similarly drafted
instruments, such courts have also managed to reach similar
interpretations from differently worded provisions." In order to
53. See SHANY, supra note 5, at 110-11. See also Elihu Lauterpacht, The Development
of the Law of International Organisations by the Decisions of International Tribunals, in
152 RECUEIL DES COURs 377, 396-402 (1976).
54. HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT 14 (1958).
55. See Rosalyn Higgins, A Babel of Judicial Voices? Ruminations from the Bench, 55
INT'L & COMP. L. 0. 791, 797-98 (2006). See also, Maffezini v. Spain, Case No. ARB/97/7,
ICSID (W. Bank), Decision on Provisional Measures, 1 6-9 (Oct. 28, 1999); Victor Pey
Casado & Pres. Allende Found. v. Chile, Case No. ARB/98/8, ICSID (W. Bank), Decision
on Provisional Measures, 17-27 (Sept. 25, 2001); Tokios Tokeles v. Ukraine, Case No.
ARB/02/18, ICSID (W. Bank), Procedural Order No. 1, 4 (July 1, 2003); Tokios Tokeles
v. Ukraine, Case No. ARB/02/18, ICSID (W. Bank), Procedural Order No. 3, 6-7 (Jan.
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facilitate such common interpretations, international courts
employ certain approaches to treaty interpretation, " although they
do not always clarify which of these approaches they rely on in
individual cases.57
The first of these approaches is the principle of effectiveness
in treaty interpretation. This is in accordance with which
"[p]articular provisions are to be interpreted so as to give them the
fullest weight and effect consistent with the normal meaning of the
words and with other parts of the text."5 International tribunals
rely on this principle in awarding remedies and asserting certain
procedural powers.59 One example is the power to grant binding
provisional measures consistent with the practice of other
international judicial bodies.'
Second, international courts have adopted an evolutional
approach to interpreting their constitutive instruments. This
approach recognizes that certain terms are not static, and their
meanings may change with time." It also permits international
courts to take account of developments elsewhere. 2
Third, international courts have taken account of
international judicial practice. International courts do this by
referring to article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties when interpreting provisions of statutes and rules.63 The
Convention provides that in interpreting treaties, "[t]here shall be
taken into account, together with the context.., any relevant rules
of international law applicable in the relations between the
18, 2005), n.12; Occidental Petrol. Corp. v. Ecuador, Case No. ARB/06/11, ICSID (W.
Bank), Decision on Provisional Measures, J 58 (Aug. 17, 2007) (in which the ICSID
Tribunals interpreted the word "recommend" consistently with ICJ jurisprudence to mean
the same as "order.").
56. See BROWN, A COMMON LAW, supra note 8, at 41-53.
57. See also Isabelle van Damme, Treaty Interpretation by the WTO Appellate Body
25 (2007) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Cambridge).
58. GERALD FITZMAURICE, THE LAW AND PROCEDURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE 50 (1986).
59. Id. at 51.
60. See generally id.
61. See generally LASSA OPPENHEIM, 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 1282
(Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed., 1992). See also Gabcikovo-Nagymaros
Project (Hung. v. Slovk.) 1997 I.C.J. 7, 67-8 (Sept. 25); Iron Rhine ("IJzeren Rijn")
Railway (Belg. v. Neth.), Award of May 24, 2005, 79-81 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2005),
available at http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag-id=1155.
62. See generally OPPENHEIM, supra note 61.
63. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 311, art. 31(3)(c) (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
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parties."' Again, this approach has been interpreted as permitting
international courts to consider the practice of other international
tribunals.
D. Rules Developed in Customary Practice and
General Principles of Law
A fourth reason for the adoption of common approaches by
international courts is to enable referencing of two well-
established sources of judicial procedure and remedies: customary
rules developed in international judicial practice and general
principles of law." For instance, in enunciating the widely accepted
rule that full reparation is the primary remedy in international law,
the PCIJ noted that this was "established by international practice
and in particular by the decisions of arbitral tribunals."' The
application of customary rules and general principles of law
harmonizes issues of procedure and remedies precisely because
they are. not derived from any specific dispute settlement regime.
Rather, they are derived from rules and principles that are usually
susceptible of general application. In applying such rules and
principles, international courts will invariably consider the practice
of other international tribunals, which leads to the adoption of
common approaches to these issues.
E, Existence of Inherent Powers
The ability of international courts to exercise inherent powers
is the fifth reason for the emergence of common approaches to
64. Id. See also Campbell McLachlan, The Principle of Systematic Integration and
Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention, 54 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 279,280 (2005); Philippe
Sands, Sustainable Development: Treaty, Custom and the Cross-Fertilisation of
International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: PAST
ACHIEVEMENTS AND FUTURE CHALLENGES 39 (Alan Boyle & David Freestone eds.,
1999); Philippe Sands, Treaty, Custom and the Cross-Fertilisation of International Law,
1 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 85,95 (1998).
65. See BROWN, A COMMON LAW, supra note 8, at 53-5. See also ROSENNE, supra
note 46, at 73; Robert Kolb, General Principles of Procedural Law, in THE STATUTE OF
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: A COMMENTARY 793 (Andreas Zimmermann
et al. eds., 2006); BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 299 (Grotius 1987) (1959); GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS, VOL.
IV: INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL LAW 584-85 (1986).
66. Factory at Chorzow (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 47 (May 25).
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issues of procedure and remedies.67 The constitutive instruments
and rules of procedure of international courts do not always confer
identical or similar powers on international courts and contain
lacunae.8 If there are gaps on issues of procedure and remedies,
international courts might have the ability to fill them by the
exercise of their inherent powers to fulfill their functions.
In exercising such powers, which may not be prescribed by
the terms of their constitutive instruments or rules of procedure,
international courts are likely to refer instinctively to the practice
of other international tribunals. For instance, in Nottebohm, the
ICJ held that its power to determine the extent of its jurisdiction,
or comptence de la competence, although contained in article
36(6) of the ICJ Statute, was "a rule consistently accepted by
general international law in the matter of international
arbitration."'69 The exercise of inherent powers can also be seen in
the decisions of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal and the
IACHR referred to above. The tribunals found they had the
power, in certain cases, to revise judgments and awards in light of
newly discovered evidence. ' Accordingly, the exercise of inherent
powers can also result in an international court adopting a
common approach found in the practice of other international
tribunals.
F. Similar Functions of International Courts and Tribunals
The sixth reason for the emerging common law of
international adjudication is that international courts essentially
fulfill the same functions.7 While there are competing conceptions
of the different functions of international courts and tribunals,
there are two general functions shared by international courts: the
settlement of disputes in accordance with law, and the proper
administration of international justice. This is not to say that
international courts with the same general functions necessarily
67. See BROWN, A COMMON LAW, supra note 8, at 55-81; Chester Brown, The
Inherent Powers of International Courts and Tribunals, 76 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 195, 202
(2005); Paola Gaeta, Inherent Powers of International Courts and Tribunals, in MAN'S
INHUMANITY TO MAN: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOUR OF ANTONIO
CASSESE 353,356 (Lal Chand Vohrar et al. eds., 2003).
68. Brown, The Inherent Powers of International Courts, supra note 67, at 202.
69. Nottebohm (Liech. v. Guat.) 1953 I.C.J. 111, 1119 (Nov. 18).
70. See supra p. 224.
71. See BROWN, A COMMON LAW, supra note 8, at 229-37; Brown, The Inherent
Powers of International Courts, supra note 67, at 229-37.
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share the same specific functions. As noted below, the specific
functions of an international court can limit the relevance of
another international court's case law to its proceedings.
Individual international courts also might have functions that
require them to decide certain issues differently. The fact that
international courts share two essential functions helps explain the
increasing convergence in jurisprudence. If an international court
can identify other international courts with common functions, this
arguably makes consideration of the practice of those courts more
relevant.
G. Limited Size of the International Bar and
International Judiciary
The seventh reason is found in the existence of a distinct
group of international lawyers who regularly appear before
different international courts. As Professor Cot observed of those
appearing before the ICJ:
Le nombre d'avocats qui plaident r6gulibrement devant la Cour
internationale de Justice peut tre estim6 A une douzaine. J'ai
retenu six noms parmi ceux-ci: trois britanniques, un australien,
deux franqais. Un ou plusieurs de ces avocats ont plaid6 dans
dix-neuf des vingt affaires contentieuses qui ont donn6 lieu
ddcision au cours de la d6cennie 6coulee. Je ne connais pas de
barreau national si restreint et de monopole mieux gard6 que
celui-lA."2
In addition to this "international bar," a limited number of people
make up the "international judiciary." Indeed, many international
judges have served on more than one international court.
It is suggested that the relatively small number of
international lawyers and judges participating in international
dispute settlement proceedings might also contribute to the
emerging common law of international adjudication." Since
international lawyers are frequently in contact with each other,
this permits them to exchange ideas related to international
adjudication. In the words of Professor Cot:
72. Jean-Pierre Cot, Le Monde de la Justice International, in LA JURISDICrION DU
DROIT INTERNATIONAL: COLLOQUE Du LILLE 511,513 (2003).
73. Id. at 514.
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Ce petit monde vit en symbiose. Juges, agents, avocats, conseils
se retrouvent aux memes bonnes tables de La Haye. Ils
fr6quentent les couloirs de la 42"' Rue et singulirement de la
VI"e Commission. Les juges sont eux-m~mes d'anciens
conseillers juridiques ou d'anciens avocats, souvent pass6s par
la Commission du droit international.74
Since these same international lawyers appear before or sit on
different international tribunals, they are likely to bring a common
legal experience to their work; procedural experience gained from
one international court is likely to be drawn on when appearing
before or serving on another such body.
H. Competition among International Courts and Tribunals
The eighth reason for this commonality is that proliferation
arguably creates a sense of competition among some international
courts. This inter-institutional competition might, in some cases,
lead to greater commonality in the approach of international
courts to certain issues of procedure and remedies. For instance,
an international court may wish to make its forum as attractive as
possible to potential litigants, leading to offers of procedural
advantages as compared with other international courts within a
similar jurisdiction. One example is the ICJ's judgment in
LaGrand in 2001. In LaGrand, the court found that provisional
measures under the ICJ Statute were binding. 5 Although the ICJ's
judgment was thoroughly reasoned, it can be speculated that it was
at least partly motivated by a desire on the part of the ICJ to
remain an attractive forum for cases involving requests for
provisional measures. This is especially true given that any
provisional measures granted under UNCLOS would definitely be
binding in view of the clear language of article 290(6) of that
76
convention.
74. Id.
75. LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.) 2001,I.C.J. at 503. See BROWN, A COMMON LAW,
supra note 8, at 146-50; Robert Jennings, The LaGrand Case, 1 LAW & PRAC. INT'L CTS.
& TRIB. 13, 35 (2002); Martin Mennecke & Christian Tams, LaGrand Case (Germany v.
United States of America), 51 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 449, 455 (2002); Xiodang Yang, Thou
Shalt Not Violate Provisional Measures, 60 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 441, 441 (2001).
76. Some suggest that it was not a "mere coincidence" that the ICJ decision in
LaGrand followed the express stipulation of the binding nature of provisional measures
granted under UNCLOS. See generally Ole Spiermann, Review of Shabtai Rosenne,
Provisional Measures in International Law: The International Court of Justice and the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, 76 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 554 (2005).
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There are limitations, however, to the importance of this
factor. There is no objective or empirical evidence that inter-
institutional competition has had any influence on the decisions of
international courts, and in this sense, its significance is difficult to
substantiate. Even if this consideration is relevant, the scope of its
operation is relatively limited. It can only have some effect in
instances where international courts have overlapping jurisdictions
such as the ICJ, the ITLOS, and other UNCLOS tribunals. There
are many other cases where this consideration does not arise; for
instance, the jurisdiction ratione materiae and ratione personae of
the WTO dispute settlement system is different than that of the
various international human rights tribunals. In this respect, the
ECHR's judgment in Mamatkulov in 2003' where it found that its
provisional measures had binding force, was arguably not
influenced by any sense of inter-institutional competition with the
ICJ, the ITLOS, or UNCLOS tribunals. This is because the
jurisdiction of these international courts does not overlap. It is
therefore safe to conclude that the emergence of commonalities in
the jurisprudence of international courts that do not have
overlapping jurisdictions is unlikely to have been motivated by
inter-institutional competition.
I. Common Practices as a Positive Development
A potential ninth reason for the emerging commonality is an
underlying belief in the minds of many international judges that
commonality is a positive development. Based on this belief, they
exercise procedural and remedial powers more or less consistently
with the practice of other international courts. In this sense, some
international tribunals might consciously strive to obtain similar
outcomes. These efforts might stem from multiple rationales.
These include, a desire for systemic coherence in the
administration of international justice, a belief that commonality
furthers the goal of "security and predictability" in international
adjudication," or even a sense of conformity with the practices ofan international court regarded as prestigious within the
77. Mamatkulov & Abdurasulovic v. Turkey, App. Nos. 46827/99 & 46951/99,
Eur. Ct. H.R., at 32. See also Mamatkulov & Askarov v. Turkey, App. Nos. 46827/99 &
46951/99, Eur. Ct. H.R., at 11.
78. See, e.g., Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, supra note 13, at art. 3(2).
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international legal order, such as the ICJ. Again, while it is difficult
to substantiate the importance of this factor without extensive
empirical research, this desire for relative consistency in the
procedural and remedial aspects of international adjudication
could help explain the emergence of increasing commonality.
J. Similar Relationships between International Courts and
Litigating Parties
A tenth reason for commonality is the existence, in some
cases, of a similar relationship between international courts and
the litigating parties before them. If a relationship exists between
international courts, such as the ICJ and the ITLOS, and the
litigants in the ICJ's case are similar to the parties before the
ITLOS, the ITLOS will likely adopt common approaches to
procedural and remedial issues. For example, international courts
may possess certain coercive powers, such as a power to issue
orders for the production of evidence,", or other mandatory orders
requiring specific performance.' Even though many international
courts possess such powers, some international courts will not
exercise them due to deference to the parties.81 Consider the ICJ,
the ITLOS, and the WTO, where the parties before these courts
are often sovereign states.' These courts will take into account the
parties' status as sovereign powers and deference to the parties
will be consistent among those courts. This contrasts with the
practice of tribunals constituted under, for instance, the ICSID
Convention and the UNCITRAL Rules, which have not
demonstrated any reluctance to issue orders directing states to
comply with certain procedural rules, such as the production of
documents."
79. See generally BROWN, A COMMON LAW, supra note 8, at 104-10.
80. Id at 209-16.
81. For example, many interstate courts are reluctant, where the parties are sovereign
states, to order the production of documents, or to issue mandatory or consequential
orders as remedies. Id. at 105.
82. See, e.g., ICJ Statute, supra note 18, at art. 34(1); ITLOS Rules of Procedure,
art. 20(1); Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
supra note 13, at art. 1(1). Note, however, that under the ITLOS Statute, art. 20(2), the
ITLOS is open to entities other than states parties in any case expressly provided for in
Part XI of UNCLOS, or in any case submitted pursuant to any other agreement conferring
jurisdiction on the ITLOS that is accepted by all parties to that case.
83. See, e.g., Biwater Guaff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. Tanzania, Case No. ARB/05/22, ICSID
(W. Bank), Procedural Order No. 1, 11 104-106 (Mar. 2006); Biwater Guaff (Tanzania)
Ltd. v. Tanzania, Case No. ARB/05/22, ICSID (W. Bank), Procedural Order No. 2, $J 8-9
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K. Practice of the Parties in Referring to the Jurisprudence of
Other International Courts
An eleventh reason for the emergence of common practices
might be found in the fact that the parties to international
litigation have pleaded the relevance of the jurisprudence of other
international courts.' Although international courts can be
presumed to know the law, in accordance with the principle jura
novit curia," the submissions of litigants on the exercise of
procedural and remedial powers will naturally have some
influence on the international court's decision.
L. Norm-Intrinsic Reasons for Common Approaches
Finally, a twelfth relevant factor is that there may be norm-
intrinsic reasons for the adoption of common approaches by
international courts and tribunals, such as the perceived fairness or
utility of the rule in question. This factor, for instance, may have
been influential in the various findings by international tribunals
on the binding nature of provisional measures86 and on the
authority of international tribunals to permit NGOs to submit
amicus curiae briefs in disputes having a public interest element.7
(May 2006); CSOB v. Slovakia, Case No. ARB/97/4, ICSIC (W. Bank), Decision of the
Tribunal on the Further and Partial Objection to Jurisdiction of Dec. 1, 2000, 251, 254
(2001); Tanzania Electric Supply Co. v. Independent Power Tanzania, Case No.
ARB/98/8, ICSID (W. Bank), Award, TT 43-44 (June 22, 2001); Feldman v. Mexico, Case
No. ARB/99/1, 7 ICSID (W. Bank) 327, %T 27, 33, 36-41 (Dec. 16, 2002); Plama
Consortium Ltd. v. Bulg., Case No. ARB/03/24, ICSID (W. Bank), Decision on
Jurisdiction, 16 (Feb. 8, 2005); GAMI Investments, Inc. v. Mexico, Proc. Order No. 1,
7.6 (Jan. 31, 2003), http://www.naftaclaims.com/disputes-mexico-gami.htm. See also
Howe v. Bank of Int'l Settlements, 23 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 153, Procedural Order No. 3
(Mar. 2002), Procedural Order No. 5 (Mar. 2002), Procedural Order No. 6 (June 2002),
Procedural Order No. 10 (Mar. 2003).
84. BROWN, A COMMON LAW, supra note 8, at 233.
85. See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.) 1986 I.C.J. 14, 24-5
(June 27); Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 3, 9. (Feb. 2). See also EC-Tariff
Preferences supra note 15, 105; CHENG, supra note 65, at 299.
86. E.g., LaGrand case (Ger. v. U.S.) 40 I.L.M. 1069, 102 (2001).
87. See, e.g., ICISD R. Proc. Arbitration Proceedings 37(2). See also, discussion in
Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd. v. Tanzania, Case No. ARB/05/22, ICSID (W. Bank),
Procedural Order No. 3, 122 (Sept. 2006); Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de
Barcelona S.A. and Interagua Servicios Integrales de Agua S.A. v. Argentina, Case No.
ARB/03/17, Order-in Response to a Petition For Participation As Amicus Curiae, 15;
Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. and Vivendi Universal. S.A. v.
Argentina, Case No. ARB/03/19; U.S.-Panel Report, U.S.-Shrimp, WT/DS58/R (May
15, 1998) (concerning the power of WTO panels to receive amicus curiae briefs);
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IV. LIMITATIONS TO THE EXISTENCE OF A COMMON LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION
There are, however, limits to the extent to which the practice
of international courts and tribunals in the fields of procedure and
remedies can converge. For the avoidance of doubt, this does not
suggest that there is now-or ever will be-a set of rules on
procedure and remedies that will have universal application before
all international courts. Rather, a number of limiting factQrs can be
identified which may curtail the further development of a common
law of international adjudication.
The most prominent limitation on the ability of international
courts to reach out and engage in a cross-fertilization of rules
relating to procedure and remedies lies in the particular drafting of
the constitutive instruments and rules of procedure of
international courts. Here, the existence of clear provisions, as well
as the level of detail on various issues in an international court's
statute and rules of procedure, will serve as limiting factors for the
emerging body of generally accepted rules. These, generally
accepted rules should not prevail over special rules that are clearly
stipulated in the court's constitutive documents. The DSU of the
WTO dispute settlement system is a case on point. The DSU
provides for many specific forms of procedure that are different
from those procedures before traditional international courts, such
as the broader right of third party intervention, and the interim
review of panel reports.'
The availability of remedies in WTO dispute settlements is
another example. While most other international courts have
adopted the general rule expressed by the PCIJ in Factory at
Chorz6w that the appropriate remedy at international law is "full
reparation," 9 WTO panels and the WTO Appellate Body are
Appellate Body Report, U.S.-Hot Rolled Steel, WT/DS138/AB/R, 1 36, 42 (May 15,
1998) (concerning the power of the WTO Appellate Body to receive amicus curiae briefs).
88. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
supra note 13, at arts. 10, 15.
89. Factory at Chorzow (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. No. 17, supra note 66, at 47. See,
e.g., ADC Affiliate Ltd. and ADC & ADMC Mgmt. Ltd. v. Hungary, Case No.
ARB/03/16, ICSID (W. Bank), Award of the Tribunal, 479-86 (Oct. 2006); Legal
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Palestinian Occupied Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 198 (July 9); M!V Saiga (No. 2) (St. Vincent v. Guinea),
120 Int'l L. Rep. 143, 199 (Int'l Trib. L. of the Sea 1999); VelAsquez Rodriguez v.
Honduras, 95 Int'l L. Rep. 306, 314 (Inter-Am. Ct. Hum. Rts. 1989); Papamichalopoulos v.
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limited by the clear terms of the DSU. Under the DSU, the main
remedy is simply "the withdrawal of the measures concerned,""
and the payment of compensation is not usually envisaged.'
Although one WTO panel has allowed its remedies to be
influenced by the general international law of reparation,' this is
arguably limited to certain disputes under the Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures Agreement and possibly, the
Antidumping Agreement.93 In the majority of WTO disputes,
reparation will be unavailable.94
A second limiting factor on the development of a common
law of international adjudication is that international courts may
have their own specific agendas and functions. These specific
functions can serve to limit-or enhance-an international
tribunal's scope to exercise certain procedural powers. For
example, if an international court has a constitutional function
within a specific regime, as evidenced by a power to render
advisory opinions in addition to its contentious jurisdiction, this
might suggest that it will be prepared to take account of wider
community interests and to accept amicus curiae briefs. Arbitral
tribunals constituted on an ad hoc basis for individual disputes, on
the other hand, may be less likely to assert procedural powers in
Greece, 330-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 59-60 (1995); Amoco Int'l Fin. Corp. v. Iran, 15
Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 189, 258 (1987).
90. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
supra note 13, at art. 3(7).
91. Although DSU, art. 3(7) refers to "compensation," this does not have the same
meaning as in general international law. Rather than meaning "an indemnity payment to
repair damage or harm caused by an unlawful act," it is a prospective measure, as it offers
relief for harm that the complainant will probably suffer pending the implementation by
the defendant of the WTO Panel's or WTO Appellate Body's recommendations. Marco
Bronckers & Naboth van den Broek, Financial Compensation in the WTO: Improving the
Remedies of WTO Dispute Settlement, 8 J. INT'L ECON. L. 101, 102-103 (2005). See also
BROWN, A COMMON LAW, supra note 8, at 218-19; Patricio Gran6, Remedies Under WTO
Law, 4 J. INT'L ECON. L. 755, 762 (2001); DAVID PALMETER & PETROS C. MAVROIDIS,
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 167 (1st ed. 1999).
92. Panel Report, Australia-Subsidies Provided to Producers and Exporters of
Leather, 951, WT/DS126[R (May 25, 1999).
93. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15 1994, 1869
U.N.T.S. 14; Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994, opened for signature Apr. 15, 1994, 1868 U.N.T.S. 201.
94. See, e.g., Bronckers & van den Broek, supra note 91, at 101-102, 106.
95. Charney, Multiple International Tribunals, supra note 4, at 371.
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furtherance of any broader public function other than the
settlement of the dispute. 6
A third issue which may have a limiting influence on the
development of a common law of international adjudication is the
relationship between each particular international court and the
parties litigating before it. To clarify, this is a factor that works
both ways: if a practice or procedure is applied before an
international court where there is considerable deference
displayed by the court towards the parties, a similar procedure is
likely to be applied before other international tribunals where a
similar type of relationship exists; if the relationship between the
court and the parties is different, the court could be less inclined to
adopt the same approach.
Finally, one consideration that might be taken into account is
whether it is indeed desirable from a normative viewpoint that the
procedures and remedies applicable before different international
courts should be the same. The practices of domestic courts are
instructive in this area. Different courts at the national level have
differing procedures, such as the varying degrees of formality that
exist between family law proceedings involving children, on one
hand, and civil litigation before the High Court, on the other.
These procedural differences are seen as desirable. An
illustration can be found in Lord Woolf's report on the English
civil litigation system, Access to Justice, published in 1996." In
chapter 19, titled Specialist Jurisdictions, Lord Woolf stated, "In
chapter 26 of my interim report I stressed that the same general
principles, rules and procedures need to apply as far as possible
throughout the system.,,98 Nevertheless, he recognized the value of
different procedures for certain matters. In his recommendations,
he observed: "A number of the special rules for intellectual
property, Chancery and Admiralty proceedings should be
96. Note, however, a trend towards facilitating the greater participation of non-
parties in international arbitration proceedings, as was recognized by the ICSID Tribunal
in Biwater Gauff Ltd., Case No. ARB/05/22, Procedural Order No. 3, 122, and as is
evidenced in the inclusion, as of 10 April 2006, of the new article 37(2) of the ICSID
Arbitration Rules, which permit the submission of "non-disputing party" briefs. See also
Loukas Mistelis, Confidentiality and Third Party Participation, 21 ARB. INT'L 211, 221-23
(2005).
97. LORD WOOLF, ACCESS TO JUSTICE: FINAL REPORT (1996), available at
http://www.dca.gov.uk/civil/final/index.htm.
98. Id. at ch. 19 T 1.
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retained."' In addition to the perceived value of these differences
which can be found in domestic court systems, alternative methods
of dispute resolution, such as mediation, arbitration, adjudication,
and expert determination, are increasingly popular for certain
types of disputes at the domestic level.'00 These have been
developed precisely because it was desirable to have different
procedures.
Likewise, there are arguably desirable limits to the increasing
convergence in procedures and remedies before international
tribunals. The differing functions of various international courts,
together with the difference in the types of parties appearing
before different international courts,101 have given rise to differing
approaches to certain issues. It is arguably beneficial that there is
broad agreement on issues such as the power of international
courts to order an expert report, the binding nature of provisional
measures, and the availability of compensation for harm to
personal property. Nevertheless, it is less clear that international
tribunals should all apply the same standard of proof to differing
claims such as an allegation of state complicity in torture '°2 and a
claim made in a boundary dispute, where there is a lack of
evidence that the uti possidetis line was in a certain location. 3
Accordingly, while it is not a limitation in itself, the desirability of
a common law of international adjudication on all issues of
procedure and remedies is a question which nonetheless places
some limitations on its further development.
V. CONCLUSION
This review of the practice of international courts on issues of
procedure and remedies reveals that there is a discernible
99. Id. at Recommendations.
100. See, e.g., ALAN REDFERN ET AL., LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 35-46 (4th ed. 2004).
101. Some international courts are designed to confer standing on individuals and
corporate entities (such as human rights courts and investment treaty tribunals) whilst
others are solely designed for the participation of states (such as the ICJ, the ITLOS, and
the WTO dispute settlement system). See ICJ Statute, supra note 18. See also
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, supra
note 13.
102. E.g., Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, 1989 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 7,
at 285 (July 21, 1989).
103. E.g., Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal. v. Hond.),
1992 I.C.J. 351, 506 (Sept. 11).
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tendency for international courts to reach out and consider the
practice of other international tribunals. The argument presented
in this article is that this is resulting in the emergence of what can
be called a "common law of international adjudication." This does
not mean, however, that international courts follow each others'
decisions all of the time or on every single issue; the different
factors at play, as described in this article, mean that some issues
are more likely to give rise to common approaches than others.
Nonetheless, this cross-fertilization of principles has resulted in
broad agreement among international judicial bodies on a range of
issues from procedure to remedies.
The emerging common law of international adjudication is a
noteworthy development with significant practical and theoretical
implications. From a practical point of view, the implications relate
not only to the resolution of procedural issues which already arise
before many international courts, but also to other issues with
which international courts are likely to be confronted and for
which their statutes and rules of procedure make no clear
provision. Indeed, with the increasing volume of international
litigation-particularly before the European Court of Human
Rights and also in the field of investment treaty arbitration-
international tribunals are being confronted with new and
challenging procedural issues, such as the regulation of parallel
proceedings and the launching of claims that could be regarded as
an abuse of process. The willingness of international courts to refer
to the practice of other international tribunals can serve to assist
them in finding answers to these issues, and in this sense, the
emerging common law of international adjudication can have
some prescriptive effect.
The emergence of common standards in international
procedure also has theoretical implications. If there is an emerging
common law of international adjudication, this might result in
answers to broader questions concerning the coherence-or
compartmentalization-of the international legal order. It is well
known that international courts do not exist as part of a formal
system, due to the notable absence of structural and hierarchical
connections. But the emergence of common approaches to
questions of procedure permits the suggestion that despite the
absence of formal links, international courts do not operate as self-
contained regimes. Rather, they regard themselves as forming part
of a community of international courts. In this sense, the
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converging practices of international courts on procedural issues
can have positive implications for the further development of the
international legal system.

